MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Secretary of the Navy

**SUBJECT** 

Soviet Naval Readiness (U

1. I have reviewed the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on "The which reported by present Readiness of Soviet Naval Forces" and am aware of the controversy which preceded its publication. This document is a valuable first step in evaluating the quality and readiness of Soviet forces. This examination the continued with greater cooperation among the participants; & I must

2. Specifically, I request that you insure senior level support to future interagency studies. In the naval readiness study, for example, some agencies reversed their positions at the last moment because of a lack of early top level participation. Ongoing studies of the readiness of Soviet forces cannot hope to succeed without your personal support.

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Halso ask that the Navy provide more benchline data to the intelligence community on US operations, such as unit availabilities, deployment rates, training, maintenance, and personnel statistics, the following collection of the comparisons which will lead to informed judgments concerning Soviet readiness and capabilities.

A. Additionally basic research on the qualitative aspects of Soviet naval power is needed. We must know more about their recruiting, training, motivation, and command practices. This information, matched with a comprehensive assessment of their weapon systems, will provide a more complete picture.

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Secretary of Defense

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DCI Talking Points for SecDef Brown

on

## Soviet Naval Readiness IIM

#### A. Readiness <u>IIM complete</u>

- Responds to your request.
- Took 2 years.
- Represents interagency views, but very controversial.

## B. Major Judgments include

- Increase in real capabilities over last 20 years tempered by <u>personnel</u> and <u>material deficiencies</u> that affect readiness to fight major war.
- Designed for short, intense war.
- Need period of warning.
- O Limited endurance
- Shortage of experienced personnel; conscripts/low reenlistment.
- Command practices, narrow training, unrealistic exercises discourage initiative and flexibility.

Unit availability

with 3 days alert

SSBNs: 43%

attack submarines: 34%

major surface ships: 27%

with 25 days alert

Percentages double.

# C. <u>DoD cooperation</u> on IIM was mixed

- Some contributions prompt, useful: For example, Navy-chaired surface ship working group provided the most useful and complete study.
- In some critical areas requests <u>ignored</u> and commitments not honored: Examples include
  - -- The DNI fought for and obtained chairmanship of key interagency working group on Soviet submarines.

    Despite urgings and complaints to DNI from NIO staff, this group held almost no meetings, produced no usable document, and left NIO staff and CIA to produce draft submarine section at last minute using its own resources.
  - -- DIA, in some instances, pulled experts off this study to prepare low-level briefings for overseas conferences.
  - -- NSA command and analytical elements were kept ignorant of the substance and progress of the paper by their own representative until the last stage.

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We could not obtain usable comparative availability data on equivalent US forces.

We could not get permission to make comparative statements about US forces (yet, DoD agencies continually argued that US Navy suffers similar deficiencies). This ban extended even to publicly known figures, such as US SSBN deployment rates.

o DoD <u>principals</u> did not focus on paper until <u>late</u> in coordination process; characterized by "eleventh hour" reversals of position and intense behind-the-scenes lobbying for DoD unity by DIA and Naval Intelligence.

- D. Nevertheless, IIM breaks new analytical ground and is valuable first step to evaluate quality of Soviet Navy.
- E. Should continue examination of Soviet Naval Readiness; but with improved DoD, particularly Navy, participation. Specifically:
  - -- Navy should provide comparative data on US operations, such as unit availability over specified time periods, deployment rates, training, maintenance, personnel statistics, etc.
  - -- Navy/NSA should commit collection resources for a concentrated examination of the training and exercise activity of individual combatants as they deploy out-of-area. With baseline data on a few specific units, we can extrapolate for force.
  - -- DoD should be more willing to concentrate its <u>analytical</u> <u>efforts</u>--early in the process--on interagency studies with high-level interest.

NOTE: Initial Navy cooperation on forthcoming IIM on Soviet Atlantic SLOC Interdiction is encouraging. I trust it will continue. DIA, on the other hand, is not supporting this effort seriously.

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Executive Registry

16 July 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary of Defense, 14 July 1980 (U)

15. I delivered the IIM on Naval Readiness and went through the talking paper quite thoroughly. I revised the draft memo for Brown to send to his own people and a copy is in the Brown briefing book. Send it down to the staff. (C/NF)

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